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Crow: The Texas Debt Collection Practices Act: Relief for the Harassed

THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
RELIEF FOR THE HARASSED DEBTOR?
WILLIAM R. CROW, JR.
Consumer credit has grown phenomenally in the United States since World
War I.1 The transformation from a prewar cash-and-carry economy to a
postwar credit economy in which the annual per capita credit expenditure
exceeds eight hundred dollars dramatically illustrates this growth. 2 The ability of today's consumer to borrow against future earnings has made consumer
credit attractive to those who want to share in the amenities available in an
upwardly mobile society.3 The desire of credit grantors to supply credit and
the eagerness of consumers to acquire goods and services financed by credit
may, however, lead to an excessive use of credit. 4 One author has noted the
existence of gross inequities in the credit marketplace due to the explosive,
albeit piecemeal, development of consumer credit. 5 Among the more patent
inequities is that existing between the creditor (or his debt collecting agent)6
7
and the defaulting consumer debtor.
1. See

NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE

UNITED STATES 5 (1972). Between 1950 and 1971, consumer credit outstanding in the
United States increased from $21.5 billion to $137.2 billion-a five-fold increase and a
compounded annual rate of growth of over nine percent. Illustrative of the phenomenal
growth of consumer credit is the fact that corporate debt in the same period rose only
four-and-one-half times. Id.
2. 60 FED. RES. BULL. A47 (Sept. 1976).
3. The growth of consumer credit is, in part at loast, attributable to the rapid rise
in the amount of discretionary income which Americans have to spend. See NATIONAL
COMM'N ON CONSUMER

FINANCE,

CONSUMER

CREDIT

IN THE UNITED

STATES

5-6

(1972).
4. Id. at 17. Most suppliers hesitate to extend credit if they doubt that the
consumer can repay his debt. The great majority of consumers likewise hesitate to
assume obligations they cannot repay. The Commission found, however, that "there
may be marginal suppliers of credit who encourage marginal borrowers who cannot
obtain credit elsewhere to become overextended." Id. at 17. For example, see In re
Tashof, 74 FT.C. 1361, 1409-10 (1968), in which the FTC held:
[lit is manifestly unfair to lure a customer into purchasing on credit without any
regard to his ability to pay. . . . As a minimum, a generous credit eligibility policy
must be matched either with some rational basis for believing that the customer can
and will pay or with an equally generous collection policy. Otherwise, the generous
eligibility policy itself is dangerously tantamount to an inducement to customers to
part with money under false pretenses.
5. Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A Debtor's
Paradiseor a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 84, 92 (1975).
6. The terms "creditor" and "collection agent (or agency)" will hereinafter be used
interchangeably, unless otherwise specified.
7. Proxmire, Foreword to D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT at ix (1974). The Senator from Wisconsin noted that:
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The debtor-creditor relationship is not cause for fiscal concern so long as
the debtor continues to make timely payments on his loan or installment
credit agreement. Once the debtor cannot (or will not) make his required
payments, however, the relationship between the debtor and creditor assumes
certain additional legal implications. The creditor may attempt to collect
from the defaulting debtor by either judicial or extrajudicial means." The
delay and expense inherent in judicial collection efforts render it likely that
the creditor will employ less costly, and sometimes more productive, extrajudicial tactics to obtain payment following default.9
The most common extrajudicial method of collection is the "dunning"
letter, which requests that the current outstanding payment be made.' 0 It
is not unusual for some debtors to ignore completely these preliminary demands of the creditor to clear the account. The creditor may at this point
seek to recover the claim by other methods. Previously, these methods have
included telephone communications to, and personal confrontation with, the
debtor." Threats of litigation 1 2 and contact with the debtor's employer'1 ex[T]he rights and remedies available to creditors on consumer credit transactions are
derived from the law governing commercial transaction. Commercial law, however,
assumes an equal bargaining position for both parties to the contract. This model
in no way describes the reality of consumer credit transactions. The consumer
borrower does not enter the transaction on equal terms with the creditor. . . . The
borrower is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. If he wants the credit, he

must agree to the terms.
Id.
8. Id. at ix-x. Senator Proxmire concluded that the typical consumer credit
contract is heavily weighted on the side of the lender. The advantage given to the
creditor is most evident when the borrower defaults. The creditor may pursue a variety
of questionable remedies to enforce his contractual rights, including: (I) demand for
payment of the entire amount due if the borrower is even one day late in making a
payment; (2) repossession of the collateral without a court order and suit for a
deficiency judgment to recover any remaining indebtedness; or (3) in some states a
confession of judgment without even notifying the debtor and attachment of the debtor's
wages without a court order. Texas prohibits confessed judgments by statute. TEX.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (1971).

Likewise, the constitutional restriction on wage

garnishment is reiterated statutorily to afford the debtor certain unequivocal safeguards.
Id. art. 4099 (1966); see TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 28.
9. Chapman, Role of Consumer Finance Companies in a Credit Economy, in THE
CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY, ITS COSTS AND REGULATION 26 (J. Chapman & R. Shay
ed. 1967). The lack of financial knowledge and self-discipline among the growing
number of overextended debtors is suggested by the increasing number of personal
bankruptcies. High collection costs for the credit granting institutions is a natural
result.
10. The typical "dunning" letter may reflect either the creditor's empathy with the
debtor's plight or his hostility to the debtor if the debt has remained outstanding for long.
See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W. 25, 26 (Iowa 1932). See generally Note, Creditor'sPreJudgment Communication to Debtor's Employer: An Evaluation, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv.
95 (1969).
11. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 18, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954).
12. Davis v. General Fin. &Thrift Corp., 57 S.E.2d 225, 226 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950).
13. E.g., Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc., v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 882-83 (Ga.
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emplify some of the high-pressure tactics utilized by the unethical creditor
or debt collector, but by no means do these represent the more reprehensible
methods devised to elicit payment. Most courts have expressed approval of
all reasonable means of collecting an outstanding debt. 14 The Texas courts,
in the vanguard of jurisdictions allowing recovery in tort for the collector's
abuses of the debtor, have even found justification for awarding damages for
"unreasonable collection efforts."' 15 At the receiving end of many of the
abuses inherent in the modern consumer credit system are the poor and the
uneducated. 16 Prior to the recent legislative enactments by consumer protection advocates, common law recovery on tort causes of action was the debtor's
primary recourse against the coercive and harassing stratagems of the unscrupulous creditor or collector.' 7 With the enactment of the Debt Collection
Practices Act,' 8 the Texas debtor would appear to be in a more equal position
vis-A-vis his creditor than was previously the case. 19
As a general rule, the principles applicable to independent contractors
work to insulate the employer of the collection agent, usually a retail merchant or a lending institution, from responsibility for torts of the collection
1957); Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa 1962); Voneve v. Turner, 240

S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1951); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558, 561 (La. Ct. App.

1944). Creditor contact with the debtor's employer has frequently been held actionable,
as the aforementioned cases exemplify.
14. Typical of these judicial sanctions is the holding of the Supreme Court of Iowa
in Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W. 25, 28 (Iowa 1932), which stated that:
"A creditor or his agent has a right to urge payment of a just debt and to threaten to
resort to proper legal procedure to enforce such payment."
15. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). The Texas
Supreme Court left the boundaries of the new tort action undefined, finding that "[a]
decision of the case before us does not require that we . . . outline the limits to which
such a creditor may go [to collect]." Id. at 20, 273 S.W.2d at 66. See generally
Martin, A Creditor'sLiability for Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a
Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 127 (1967).
16. "Clearly, unemployment, low occupational status, and low income are related to
and contribute to defaults in consumer debt transactions." D. CAPLOVrrZ, CONSUMERS
IN TROUBLE: A STUDY oF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 18 (1974). Of the 1,320 debtors
surveyed in the Caplovitz study, 25% were not working at the time of the default-"a
figure that is more than six times the average unemployment rate during the first half of
the sixties." id. The author reasoned further that educational level and vulnerability to
deception were inversely proportional, in concluding that:
mhe better educated, as more sophisticated shoppers, are more likely to demand
and receive full disclosure, regardless of the type of seller with whom they deal.
Or the better educated may avoid the more unscrupulous sellers, the ones more
prone to evade the law. The data suggest that the latter view has much merit.
Id. at 44.
17. See Mikva, An Overview, 26 Bus. LAW. 753, 754 (1971). The author advocated
restoration of a marketplace that will give some recognition to the fact that both sides to
a consumer credit transaction need some kind of protection. Id. at 755.
18. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Supp. 1976-1977). The Act
became effective on August 27, 1973.
19. Id. art. 5069-11.11. The remedies afforded under the Act are inclusive of the
existing common law theories of recovery.
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agency or its employees. 20 A creditor will not be relieved from liability, however, if the tort was committed at the creditor's direction or through his negligence.2 1 The collection of delinquent debts is both a necessary and a disagreeable function, made even more unpleasant when the debtor fails to
respond to polite requests for payment. Given the sometimes questionable
basis for extension of loan or installment credit to high-risk borrowers or consumers, the reasons underlying the use of high-pressure tactics to recover the

outstanding debt become apparent.2 2 Where repossession of the consumer
goods is possible, the creditor's losses may be partially recouped. 28 Absent
the ability to repossess, the creditor may seek wage garnishment, 24 or he may
attempt execution on the debtor's nonexempt property.2 5 Professor David
Caplovitz of Columbia University, in his study on defaulting debtors, suggests
that because of severe statutory restrictions or outright prohibitions on wage
garnishment and property executions in Texas, the intrastate creditors are
20. E.g., Lynch Jewelry Co. v. Bass, 124 So. 222, 225 (Ala. 1929); Fraser v.
Morrison, 39 Haw. 370 (1952); Inscoe v. Globe Jewelry Co., 157 S.E. 794, 795 (N.C.
1931) (creditor not liable for a wrongful arrest made by an employee of the
collection agency).
21. Loughan v. Harger-Haldeman, 7 Cal. Rptr. 581, 585-87 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
22. Proxmire, Foreword to D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT at x (1974). "In . . . 25 percent of the cases, the debtor
defaulted because he was overextended. While borrowers have some responsibility to
live within their means, the creditor is at least partially responsible for extending credit
to borrowers who are already overburdened with debt." Id. It is not an infrequent
occurrence, for example, for branch managers of chain retail establishments and loan
companies to allow high-risk consumers credit on the faulty assumption that the inflated
credit transactions will impress a superior in the firm's headquarters. Problems arise
when it becomes necessary to extract the Shakespearean "pound of flesh" from a
recalcitrant debtor. The branch manager, who has gambled on the debtor's ability to
pay, will sometimes authorize wholly unscrupulous collection practices to recover the
debt before his superior becomes aware of his lax credit-extension policies.
23. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS INTROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN
DEFAULT 183-86 (1974). Repossession is a creditor remedy based on the pre-Uniform
Commercial Code principle of the conditional sale under which title to merchandise
remains in the creditor pending final payment, and resale of the used merchandise may
be effectuated. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 206-07 (3d ed. 1975).
24. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 225
(1974). Wage garnishment has been called "the most powerful weapon in the creditor's
arsenal in the states that officially recognize it." Id. at 227. Only Texas and Pennsylvania prohibit garnishment of wages, but the latter does not impose the strict restraints
on execution on nonexempt property as Texas does. Id. at 227.
25. See generally Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A
Debtor's Paradise or a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 84, 88-89 (1975). The Texas
debtor, unless his fraudulent intent is disclosed, may play a game of asset "hide-and-seek"
with the creditor. Texas permits exemptions from execution on the debtor's homestead,
household and kitchen furniture, cemetery lots, tools, apparatus, and books belonging to
any trade or profession, among other exemptions. Id. at 88-89. In 1973 the Texas
Legislature raised the total value of allowable exempted properties to $15,000 for single
adults and $30,000 for a family. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Supp. 19761977).
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and unusually high interest rates than credimore likely to rely on harassment
26
tors in other jurisdictions.
COMMON LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR HARASSMENT

Prior to the enactment in 1973 of the Debt Collection Practices Act, 2 7 the
common law theories on which debtor recovery for abuse and harassment

had most often been predicated included the intentional infliction of mental
distress, 28 the invasion of the right to privacy, 29 and defamation.80

Mental Anguish
Perhaps the leading debt collection case in the field of intentional
infliction of mental distress is the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in

Duty v. General Finance Co.,"1 in which the plaintiff-debtors alleged a prolonged course of harassment and wrongful collection efforts against them
commencing from the first time they missed a payment on their loan obligation. Plaintiffs endured a daily barrage of lengthy, threatening telephone
calls, threats to blacklist them with a credit-reporting agency, accusations that

they were "deadbeats" and repetition of such to the plaintiffs' neighbors and
employers, threats to garnish their wages, and denigration in the presence of
their fellow employees.8

2

As a result of this extreme course of conduct, the

26. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 257
n.1 (1974). The Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez has said that:
Texas probably has the biggest, most aggressive, and unquestionably the most diverse consumer loan industry in the country. Texas small lenders . . . underwrite
the biggest number of very high risk small loans in the nation, and they write off
perhaps ten percent of these loans . . .and still make annual profits of at least
11%o net. The lack of garnishment certainly has not inhibited lenders from doing
business [inTexas], has not kept them from entering aggressively into very high
risk loans, and has not harmed their profit picture at all.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES

229 (1972).
27. TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Supp. 1976-1977).
28. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). One of the
earliest decisions exemplifying this intentional tort held an undertaker liable for his
failure to cremate the body of the plaintiff's son, in an effort to coerce payment of an
unpaid funeral expense involving another member of the plaintiff's family. Gadbury v.
Bleitz, 233 P. 299, 300 (Wash. 1925).
29. Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (public
disclosure of private facts); Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956) (intrusion of
privacy). A rather interesting innovation on the creditor's disclosure of the plaintiff's
debt was noted in Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.
1962), where the creditor publicly stripped the tires off plaintiff's car. This circumstance was held to be a "demonstrable publication" of the debt and therefore actionable.
Id. at 10.
30. Turner v.Brien, 167 N.W. 584 (Iowa 1918).
31. 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
32. Id. at 18-19, 273 S.W.2d at 65. The person who isnot willing to pay islacking
incharacter, according to the credit industry, and is therefore a "deadbeat," the term of
denigration which the industry applies to those who default. "'Deadbeat' implies bad
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plaintiffs grew nervous, irritable, developed severe headaches, and were
unable to perform their work as they had prior to the commencement of the

defendant's collection efforts.3 3 Mrs. Duty lost her job as a consequence of
the defendant's abusive attacks on her integrity that were directed to her employer and as a result of her declining efficiency at work. The plaintiffs'
credit rating was destroyed in the process. On appeal from the El Paso Court
of Civil Appeals, the plaintiffs alleged error in the dismissal of their cause,
34
and the supreme court agreed.
Prior to the Duty decision, the Texas Supreme Court had held that
damages could not be recovered for mental anguish alone.3 5 There was no
question before the court in Duty, however, as to whether damages might
be had for physical injury, injury to property, or other elements of actual
damages.3 6 Relying on an earlier federal decision,3 7 the Texas Supreme
Court in Duty acknowledged that the petitioners had alleged physical injury
incidental to mental anguish, loss of employment, and acts constituting
slander.38 The tort action for intentional infliction of mental distress has
proven effective "as a potent counter-weapon against the more outrageous
high-pressure methods of collection agencies and other creditors."3 9 Emotional distress has been variously called mental suffering, mental anguish, and
mental or nervous shock, and has been found to include a variety of highly
unpleasant mental reactions. 40 Violent cursing, abuse, and accusations of
faith on the part of the debtor, but the debtor's willingness to pay can also be
undermined by bad faith on the part of the creditor. Consumers may default not
because they cannot pay or are irresponsible, but because they feel that the creditor has
been irresponsible by cheating them in some fashion." D. CAPLOVrrZ, CONSUMERS IN
TROUBLE:

A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 51 (1974).

33. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 19, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954).
34. Id. at 20, 273 S.W.2d at 66. The Supreme Court of Texas held that by
reasonable efforts to collect a debt, a creditor runs no risk of liability, but "[riesort to
every cruel device which his cunning can invent in order to enforce collection when that
course of conduct has the intended effect of causing great mental anguish to the debtor,
resulting in physical injury and causing his loss of employment, renders the creditor
liable to respond in damages." Id. at 17, 273 S.W.2d at 66.
35. Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 649-50, 254 S.W.2d 81, 86 (1953).
36. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). The Texas
Supreme Court rejected the rule expressed in Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W.
25. 28 (Iowa 1932), that where the act is willful or malicious and not merely negligent,
recovery may be had for mental pain although no physical injury results.
37. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1939). A
divided court held that for centuries courts have permitted recovery under the name of
assault for intentionally induced fear of a contact either harmful or offensive. In those
cases the plaintiff has not been required to show that the fear produced physical
consequences. Id. at 64.
38. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 18, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954).
39. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 57 (4th ed. 1971).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46, Comment j, at 77 (1965). Among
the reactions identified with severe mental or emotional distress are fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.
Id. at 77.
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dishonesty typify the tactics employed by overzealous debt collectors that the
courts have found to be actionable. 41 Threats of cancelled credit, arrest, or
litigation have provided grounds for recovery when mental distress to the
debtor has resulted. 42

While the Duty holding seems to comport with the

43
views of authorities in the field of intentional infliction of mental distress,
it has been criticized on several grounds. 44 Generally, the Texas courts have
liberally construed physical injury to allow debtor recovery for the intentional
infliction of mental distress, and a variety of complaints have sufficed to war4
rant damages. 5

41. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 18, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954).
Technically, the action in Duty was one for unreasonable collection efforts, which one
author has called a "nebulous concept," indiscriminately mixing intentional misconduct,
gross negligence, and ordinary negligence. See Martin, A Creditor's Liability for
Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEx. L.J. 127
(1967). Intentional infliction of mental distress has been the basis for recovery in a
number of jurisdictions. E.g., American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 176 S.E. 798 (Ga. Ct. App.
1934); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W. 25 (Iowa 1932); LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W. 424 (Neb. 1934); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 188
S.E. 625 (N.C. 1936); see Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm to
Bystanders-Should Recovery Be Denied?, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 560, 561 n.7 (1975).
42. See generally Annots., 27 A.L.R.3d 1152 and 27 A.L.R.3d 1202 (1969).
43. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 56 n.81 (4th ed. 1971),
citing RESTATEMENT OF ToRT'S § 46, Comment g (1948), which imposes liability in those
situations where the actor's conduct has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.

See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033 (1936).
44. Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A Debtor's
Paradise or a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 84, 107 (1975). Professor Anderson
criticized retention by the courts of the artificial requirement of physical injury or
pecuniary loss in order to establish a cause of action for unreasonable collection
practices, contending that by attaching a novel name to what was essentially an old tort
action, the court did not offer citizens of Texas the degree of protection afforded citizens
of other jurisdictions in earlier decisions which abolished the requirement of physical
injury. Id. at 107; e.g., Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349, 352 (Ariz. 1954); State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952); Barnett v. Collection Serv.
Co., 242 N.W. 25, 28 (Iowa 1932); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558, 561 (La. Ct.
App. 1944); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W. 424, 426 (Neb. 1934). Also
criticized was the failure of the Texas Supreme Court to delineate the permissible bounds
of coercive collection activity, but this criticism seems unwarranted when specific
legislative prohibitions are available. See generally Martin, A Creditor's Liability for
Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEx. L.J. 127
(1967).
45. Ware v. Paxton, 359 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. 1962) (nervousness); Duty v.
General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 18-19, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954) (headaches, nervousness, loss of appetite); United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bain, 393 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1965), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 400 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1966)
(headaches, nausea, blackouts); Signature Indorsement Co. v. Wilson, 392 S.W.2d 484,
488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (nausea, nervousness, loss of
appetite, numbness, crying spells); United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Smith, 387 S.W.2d 752,
756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fatigue and crying spells); Moore v.
Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962), writ rerd n.r.e. per curiam,
362 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962) (nervousness and insomnia); Advance Loan Serv. v.
Mandik, 306 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ) (vomiting);
Allison v. Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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Perhaps the most encouraging decision to the aggrieved debtor in Texas
is a recent holding which allowed the wife of a debtor, who himself suffered
a near-fatal heart attack, recovery for her mental anguish although she
40
alleged no physical injury as to herself.

Invasion of Right to Privacy
A second ground of recovery in tort has been recognized where there has
been an invasion of one's right to privacy. 4 7 Although courts of other jurisdictions have chosen to "distinguish" this tort for purposes of debtor recovery
from the intentional infliction of mental distress, the fact situations involved
in the cases have been practically indistinguishable from those Texas cases
where the action was brought for the intentional infliction of mental distress
or for the negligence-tainted concept of unreasonable collection efforts. 48
The apparent key to recovery for wrongful intrusion into one's privacy is
proof that the invasion was outrageous or caused anguish to a person of
49
ordinary sensibilities.
Defamation
An action for defamation offers yet a third ground of tort recovery in situations where the creditor has allegedly maligned a debtor or caused him to
(numbness); Industrial Fin. Serv. Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 157 Tex. 306, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957) (vomiting);
Wright v. E-Z Fin. Co., 267 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (blackouts).
46. Credit Plan Corp. v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975).
47. Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956). The Supreme Court of Ohio
found that the action of a collection agency and its representatives in initiating a
campaign to harass and torment the debtor was unreasonable and constituted a wrongful
invasion of the right of privacy. Id. at 344. Although divided as to whether the
collector had a privilege to collect the debt, even the dissent accepted the validity of the
following jury charge:
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. Its foundation is in the conception
of inviolate personality and personal immunity . . . . The violation of the right
of privacy consist [sic] of the interference in another's seclusion by subjecting him
to unwarranted and undesired publicity, or being harassed in his or her employment.
Id. at 346. (dissenting opinion). No Texas court has cited the Housh rule with
approval.
48. Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962), writ ref'd n.r.e.
per curiam, 362 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962). In this case the employer was not involved in
the dispute between the creditor and the debtor, but was granted relief where 'the
collection efforts were deemed unreasonable as to him. Id. at 96.
49. Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ohio 1956). Such a standard still allows
a collector to engage in potentially abusive practices. The Supreme Court of Ohio
acknowledged that a collection agency might continue to inform an employer of his
employee's outstanding debt, without intruding on the debtor's right of privacy. Id. at
344. See also Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959),

holding a creditor's threats against and abuse of defendant in presence of others at
defendant's place of employment actionable as an invasion of privacy.
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be held in contempt by his peers.50 Where the creditor's actions against the
debtor result in a subsequent refusal of credit to the debtor on the basis of
a false publication intentionally made, the action for defamation will lie
against the creditor. 5 1 The problem with attempting to recover on the basis
of defamation is that the truth of the allegations made by the creditor concerning the debt often relieves him of any liability. 52
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE:
THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

The Texas Consumer Credit Code was enacted in 1967 with the express
intent of correcting "abuses

. .

.especially prevalent in the area of consumer

transactions both cash and credit."'

3

Targeted for special scrutiny were

"[u]nscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors . . . [who] impose intoler-

able burdens on those segments of society which can least afford to bear them
'54
-the uneducated, the unsophisticated, the poor and the elderly."
The recent codification of standards for conduct of debt collection practices
in Texas, as well as traditional remedies for the aggrieved consumer debtor,5 5
have been heralded in some quarters as a strong deterrent to improper collecting procedures. 50 The "debt" 5 7 to be collected must have arisen from an
obligation, or alleged obligation, involving a "consumer transaction"5 8 in
50. Turner v. Brien, 167 N.W. 584, 585 (Iowa 1918) (creditor held liable where he
listed debtor's name on "poor credit risk" list while amount owed remained in
dispute).
51. Id. at 586. "[Alny publication concerning a person or his affairs, which from
its nature necessarily must or presumably will as its natural and proximate consequence,
occasion him pecuniary loss, is libelous per se." Id. at 586.
52. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 776 (4th
ed. 1971).
53. Foreword to TEXAS CREDIT CODE (1975). This booklet is a compilation of all
consumer protection legislation enacted in Texas since 1967 and is distributed by the
Office of the Commissioner of Consumer. Credit.
54. Id.
55. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Supp. 1976-1977).
56. See Preface to AMERICAN COLLECTORS ASS'N, TEXAS COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT (1973). This booklet offers explanations of the statute's significance to the "debt
collector," a term which includes credit grantors as well as collection agencies and credit
bureaus. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01(c) (Supp. 1976-1977). A debt
collector is further defined as a "person," which includes an "individual, corporation,
trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, or any other legal entity."
Id. art. 5069-11.01(g). The significance of the previous statement lies in the remedies
available to the debtor under § 11.10 of the Act. Id. art. 5069-11.10. The booklet was
prepared by the Associated Credit Bureau of Texas, Inc. and American Collect6rs Association of Texas, Inc., which concluded that "this Act in no way restricts proper and
businesslike debt collection." Preface to AMERICAN COLLECTORS ASS'N, TEXAS COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (1973).
57. TEX. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
58. Id. art. 5069-11.01(e). The Act would, therefore, not pertain where a business
concern was seeking debt recovery from another commercial concern, since a "consum-
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which one (or more) of the parties was a "consumer" 59 and the other party
was a "creditor."' 0 The Act, while constituting a major advance in filling
the prior regulatory void over Texas collection practices, has been criticized
because of its narrowly drawn specific prohibitions, which by implication permit debt collecting in any manner that is not specifically forbidden. Unfortunately, case law construing the statute is as yet too sparse to determine
realistically how strictly the courts are going to adhere to these prohibitions.
The section of the Act dealing with "threats or coercion" to collect the debt
is a good example of the statute's unnecessary specificity. 6 ' The prohibition
of threats or use of violence or criminal means against the person or property
of another to collect a debt 6 2 is not objectionable since it covers a broad
spectrum of potential collection abuses. Likewise, there is little objection to
forbidding false accusations (or threats thereof) by the debt collector of fraud
or other criminal acts against the debtor.68 If there is such an assertion, the
burden of proof is on the debt collector to establish his belief that a crime
was committed, or a fraud perpetrated, by the debtor; failure to meet this burden renders the collector liable to the consumer. The Act provides that the
debt collector may not represent to a third party (ordinarily a credit bureau
or collection agency) that a debt is nondisputed when there is a challenge
to its accuracy, and the consumer has notified the collector in writing of the
dispute.6 4 There is no penalty under the Act if a consumer debt is sold or
assigned to a third party; the collector, however, may not threaten sale or
assignment of the debt (without so doing) merely to obtain leverage against
the debtor in coercing payment.65 A collector is forbidden to threaten that
er" under the Act is an individual whose debt is one incurred primarily for personal.
family, or household purposes.
59. Id. art. 5069-11.01(d).
60. Id. art. 5069-11.01(f). The "creditor" is a party who extends credit for personal.
family, or household purposes.
61. Id. art. 5096-11.02. The courts must have some latitude to construe the Act, so
as to proscribe unsavory collection practices which the inventive debt collector may conjure to defeat the Act's effectiveness. See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105
F.2d 62, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See generally Tarkington v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 516 S.W.
2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Credit Plan Corp. v. Gentry,
516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975).
62. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
63. Id. art. 5069-11.02(b).
64. Id. art. 5069-11.02(c). Where the credit grantor also happens to be the collector,
he must exercise care in making certain that the information reported to other grantors
of credit and to credit bureaus and collection agencies is accurate. It is unnecessary to
report details where the debt is challenged since notification that the debt is "disputed" is
sufficient. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
It
should be noted that no provision is made under the Debt Collection Practices Act
to forward the debtor's written dispute of the debt if it is received by the creditor or
collector after the report has been made to a third party that the debt is undisputed.
65. TEx. Rv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(d) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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the debtor will be arrested, but he may threaten arrest if the debtor has
violated a criminal law.66 The debt collector may presumably threaten
to file criminal charges only where there is a belief on the collector's part
that a criminal act has been committed by the debtor. There is no such
prohibition against threatening to institute civil litigation to recover the debt,
67
nor is there an express requirement that such a lawsuit ever be filed.
Finally, a collector may threaten seizure, repossession, or sale of goods only
where he has a legal or express contractual right to do so.68
The Texas Legislature sought to impose specific prohibitions in four areas
where debtor harassment and abuse have been especially prevalent.6 9 This
action has been criticized as nothing more than the legislature's distaste for
bell-ringing and profanity. 70 The debt collector may not use profane or obscene language when addressing the debtor, although the burden of proving
whether the collector intended to abuse the hearer or reader of the language
appears to be on the debtor. 7 ' Nor has one of the most objectionable abuses
been entirely eliminated: the telephone call in which the caller does not disclose his identity.72 When making a collect telephone call or when transmitting any communication where the recipient of the message is required to
incur expense in accepting the communication, the collector initiating the
transmission must first disclose his name. 78 While simply placing a telephone
call is not in and of itself actionable, the repeated and continuous telephoning
of the debtor coupled with a willful intent to harass the party so contacted
74
is a violation of the Act.
The Act also outlines practices which the legislature designated as "unfair
or unconscionable means" of collecting the debt.7 5 Under this group of
66. Id. art. 5069-11.02(e). The most likely, but certainly not the only, reason that
the creditor might threaten arrest for criminal violation would appear to be in the situation where a "hot" check was passed as payment for the consumer goods or services.
See TE . PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.06, 32.41 (1974).
67. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(f) (Supp. 1976-1977). One court
has held that "it cannot be a deceptive practice to advise that an unpaid account will be
referred to an attorney for civil action if the debtor does not respond." Credit Bureau of
Laredo, Inc. v. State, 515 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974), aff'd,
530 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1975).

68. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(g) (Supp. 1976-1977).
69. Id. art. 5069-11.03.
70. Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A Debtor's
Paradiseor a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 84, 123 (1975).

71. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.03(a) (Supp. 1976-1977); see Ledisco
Financial Serv., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ); Bank of North America v. Bell, 493 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
72. Tnx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.03(b) (Supp. 1976-1977). There is no
violation unless there is proof of two elements: nondisclosure of the caller's name and
the willful intent to annoy, harass, or threaten the recipient of the call. Id.
73. Id. art. 5069-11.03(c).
74. Id. art. 5069-11.03(d).
75. Id. art. 5069-11.04. Although "unconscionable" is not defined under the Act,
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abuses, the debt collector may not entice or pressure the debtor to sign a
statement or otherwise acknowledge that the consumer transaction involved
necessities of life, when in fact the transaction was for unnecessary goods or
services.76 The debt collector may attempt to collect any interest, charge,
fee, or other incidental expense if that expense was expressly authorized by
the agreement that created the obligation, or he may enter into a new agreement with the debtor that effectively extinguishes the original obligation and
creates in its place a new agreement with the additional expenses incorporated therein. 7 The impact of this section lies in its hindering a creditor from
collecting or attempting to collect an amount of money for which there is no
obligation by the debtor. The prevention of oppression and unfair surprise,
in the context used in the Uniform Commercial Code, is a major concern of
78
the Act.
The most lengthy section of the Debt Collection Practices Act identifies
"fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations." A debt collector
who violates this section may be subject to penalty. 79 The debt collector
is prohibited from using names other than the business, professional, or legal
name under which he operates his collection service. This prohibition, when
considered in conjunction with other existing statutes, still allows the collector
a great deal of latitude to perpetrate a fraud on the debtor.80 The debt colsome clarification might be had by resorting to the Uniform Commercial Code commentary on what constitutes unconscionability in the commercial setting. The Code's
draftsmen believed that:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract ....
The principle is one of prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise ....
U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 (emphasis added). The official text of this Code section
has been adopted in Texas. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC 1968).
Although there is presently no case authority delineating the scope of "unconscionable
means," the gist of § 11.04 appears to be an attempt to deter the dishonest collector's
efforts to obligate the debtor to a transaction not originally bargained for.
76. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.04(a) (Supp. 1976-1977). "Necessaries of life," although undefined in the statute, apparently encompasses food, clothing,
shelter, medical, and similar expenses.
77. Id. art. 5069-1104(b). Where a real estate loan is renewed or a contract of sale
is reinstated following default by the obligor, the creditor may charge a reasonable fee as
consideration for the reinstatement. Otherwise, the section appears unequivocal: no
collection of add-on fees is allowed if the written agreement does not authorize them. The
effect of this subsection is for all practical purposes the same as subsection 11.05(j) of
the Act.
78. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
79. Tax. Rav. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.05 (Supp. 1976-1977).
Sixteen
specific practices comprise the list of prohibited practices in this section.
80. Id. art. 5069-11.05(a). The upshot of this provision is that the debt collector or
his employee may presumably use an assumed name in the operation of the collection
service if that is his professional appellation. The assumption of a separate identity for
collection purposes is ostensibly a tactic that prevents the vengeful debtor from seeking
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lector may not falsely represent that he has information or something of value
for the consumer in order to discover the debtor's whereabouts. 8 ' Only
where money is demanded by the collector for the alleged debt is disclosure
of the identity of the creditor seeking payment required.8 2 If a written communication from the debt collector refers to a debt alleged to be delinquent,
the debt collector's name and street address must be clearly indicated in the
correspondence.8 3 In connection with this requirement, a debt collector may
not demand that the debtor direct his response to the communication to a
place other than the street address or the post office box listed on the credi84
tor's or collector's original transmission.
A violation of the Act occurs if the character, extent, or amount of the
debt is misrepresented to the debtor, or if its status in a judicial or governmental proceeding is falsely portrayed.85 If the collector represents that he
is affiliated with the government, when he has no such affiliation, he may
be penalized under the Act. 8 Likewise, he is forbidden from creating the
impression by use, distribution, or sale of a written communication purporting to represent his activity that his services are approved by a governmental
87
agency or other official authority.
personal retribution against the debt collector or his employees. More often, however,
an assumed name is little more than a facade, which allows a collector to harass the
debtor, then change identities back and forth between a legal name and an assumed
name, thereby leaving the debtor perplexed as to which individual, if any, he may
maintain an action against. Until recently, in Texas the use of an assumed name
required registration by the user of that name with the county clerk. Failure to so
register was punishable as a misdemeanor offense. The statute has been repealed,
Tex. Laws 1921, ch. 73, § 1, at 142, decriminalized, and transferred to the civil statutes.
The new law requires, in part:
[the filing of] a certificate setting forth the name under which such business is . . .
to be conducted or transacted, and the true or real full name or names of the person
or persons conducting or transacting the same, with the post-office address or the
addresses of said person or persons.
T~x. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5924.1 (Supp. 1976-1977).
81. Id. art. 5069-11.05(b). The debt collector need not disclose his purposes if his
aim is solely to discover the location of the debtor. If the communication is for the purpose of attempting to collect the debt, however, that purpose must be made known to the
third party. Id. art. 5069-11.05(d).
82. Id. art. 5069-11.05(c).
83. Id. art. 5069-11.05(e). The individual employees of the debt collector are under no such obligation to list their names or street addresses.
84. Id. art. 5069-11.05(f). One of the few provisions of the Act obviously aimed at
protecting the consumer, this subsection assures the debtor if he wishes to challenge the
alleged debt that he is not dealing with some fictitious collection agency; he may in fact
go to the address given to dispute the claim. Id. art. 5069-11.05(f).
85. Id. art. 5069-11.05(g). The debt collector may not impliedly represent that a
suit has been filed on the debt when it has not. Nor may the debtor be intimidated by
a false report that a warrant exists for his arrest. Id. art. 5069-11.05(g).
86. Id. art. 5069-11.05(h).
87. Id. art. 5069-1105(i). The use by the collector of a seal or insignia simulating
that of a governmental agency is additionally precluded by this subsection. Id. art. 506911.05(i).
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Because attorneys' fees, investigatory fees, and the like are awarded in the
court's discretion, the debt collector may not falsely represent to the debtor
that the debt will definitely be increased by such fees.8 8 False representation
of the status or nature of services rendered by the debt collector or his
89
business may also render him liable.
The collector must conform to United States postal laws and regulations;
otherwise the Act effectively allows a "person" 90 to bring an action in the
courts of Texas, even where the federal government refuses to intercede. 91
The debt collector may not send communications that purport to issue from
an attorney or a law firm9 2 or represent that the debt is in the hands of an
attorney for collection purposes when it is not. 93
The final prohibition against deceptive representations under the Act
pertains to misrepresenting that the debt payment is being sought by an independent collection service when in fact it is being collected by an "in-house"
collection agency, in which the debt is collected by the same party to whom
94
it is owed.
The specificity of the creditor-biased prohibitions against deceptive or
fraudulent practices in the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act and the lack
of a blanket prohibition against several questionable collection practices come
into sharp conflict with the depiction of Texas as a "debtor's paradise." 98
Section 11.05 of the Act is cross-referenced to the Deceptive Trade Practices
-- Consumer Protection Act 9" (DTPA), with the implication that a practice
deemed "deceptive" under the Debt Collection Practices Act may also be
actionable under the DTPA. 97 The operations of the debt collector appear
88. Id. art. 5069-11.05(k). If the agreement between the debtor and the creditor
stipulates a contractual right of the creditor to attorneys' fees, there is no violation of
this subsection. Id. art. 5069-11.05(j).
89. Id. art. 5069-11.05(1). Compare id. art. 5069-11.05(1), with 16 C.F.R. § 237.6
(1976).
90. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01(g) (Supp. 1976-1977).
91. Id. art. 5069-11.05(m).
92. Id. art. 5069-11.05(n).
93. Id. art. 5069-11.05(o).
94. Id. art. 5069-11.05(p). The subsection labels such a scheme as "a subterfuge organization under the control and direction of the person to whom the debt is owed."
There is no sanction against a creditor owning its own bona fide collection agency. Id.
art. 5069-11.05(p). If the debt collector is represented to be a bona fide independent
collection agency, it seems logical that: (1) the agency would exist apart from the creditor, with different employees and at a separate location; (2) that the creditor not have
sole control of its operation; and (3) that it collect debts for parties other than the
creditor.
95. See generally Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A
Debtor's Paradiseor a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 84 (1975).
96. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Supp. 1976-1977).
97. Authority for this proposition is merely speculative although at least one court
has recently cited both the Debt Collection Practices Act and the repealed Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 274, § 2, at 609, in the same case.
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subject to the DTPA's general declaration and scope.9 8 The DTPA delineates
twenty deceptive practices, but this list is not inclusive of all acts prohibited
thereunder.99 At least four DTPA provisions furnish a probable basis for
prosecuting an action not specifically outlawed by the Debt Collection Prac-

tices Act' 0 0 where there has been a fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading

representation made to the debtor in the collection process. 101 The principal advantage to successful recovery under the DTPA is that treble damages
10 2
may be awarded as well as court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Notably absent from the prohibitions of the Debt Collection Practices Act
is any restraint on contact with the debtor's family, his friends and neighbors,

or his employer and fellow employees. In the past these contacts have been
objectionable to the party contacted, as well as a source of humiliation to
the debtor.' 0 3
The deceptive use of the name of a credit bureau is another aspect of the
Debt Collection Practices Act' 0 4 that captures the spirit of -the Federal

See Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc. v. State, 515 S.W.2d 706, 710, 712 n.6 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974), aff'd, 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1975). The court found that
there was no deceptive trade practice where a credit bureau advised that an unpaid
account would be referred to an attorney for civil action if the debtor did not respond,
citing the current Debt Collection Practices Act as authority. Id. at 711-12.
98. "False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful." TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a)
(Supp. 1976-1977).
99. Id. § 17.46(b).
100. Forbidden practices likely to govern debt collection deceptions include:
(1) passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(3) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, [or] characteristics . . . which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval,
status, affiliation, or connection which he does not.
Id. § 17.46(b)(1)-(3), (5).
101. Id. § 17.41-.63.
102. Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
103. The State Finance Commission has promulgated certain regulatory measures
deemed necessary for the enforcement of Chapter 3 of the Texas Consumer Credit Code,
entitled "Regulated Loans." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.01 (Supp. 19761977). The regulations allow
a [loan] licensee or his agent . . . the right to contact any person in order to secure
information concerning a borrower. Provided, however, when any person other
than the borrower, the borrower's spouse, a member of the borrower's household,
or a co-maker . . . or guarantor of the obligation objects to any such contact, . . .
such licensee or his agent shall forthwith cease and desist from any further contact
with such person.
Tex. Fin. Comm'n, Regulations, art. 8, § 8.02 (1973).
In addition, the Commission
requires a decipherable written record of all contacts with the borrower or any other
person, including the date, method of contact, contacted party, person initiating the
contact, and the essence of the contact. Id. § 8.03. No similar protection is afforded
consumers obligated on installment loan or retail installment transactions.
104. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.06 (Supp. 1976-1977).
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Trade Commission Guides Against Debt Collection Deception. 10 5 Both the
Texas act and the FTC guidelines prevent a debt collector and an "industry
member," 106 respectively, from purporting to be a credit-reporting agency
when it does not provide such a service.' 0 7 The Texas statute excepts from
its effect any nonprofit retail trade association qualifying as a bona fide business league' 08 that does not engage in debt collection or credit reporting.' 0 9
A separate section of the Texas debt collection statute is designed to prevent a creditor from employing the services'of any independent debt collector
who repeatedly engages in practices forbidden elsewhere in the Act, once the
creditor has actual knowledge of those violations. 10 The Act also contains
the proviso that a bona fide error will not amount to a violation of any section
of the statute, where the collector has adopted reasonable procedures to avoid
the error."'
Violation of one or more provisions of the Act is a misdemeanor, which
is punishable upon conviction by a fine per violation of not less than one
hundred dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars. 112 The misdemeanor
3
action must be filed within one year from the date of the alleged violation."1
It does not appear likely that a debt collector will risk violation of the Act
and payment of a fine if the alleged debt is significantly smaller than the
minimum one hundred dollar penalty. In this regard, the Act should curtail
much of the harassment and deception involved in pursuing relatively small
outstanding balances on loans and retail installment contracts where the
debtor is only a few payments in arrears. Court costs and attorneys' fees

reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended may be recovered
where a successful action is maintained by the debtor for either actual damages or injunctive relief or both." 4 An important aspect of the Debt Collection Practices Act is the section availing debtors, creditors, and all other
legal entities of any previously existing remedies at law or in equity to which
they may be entitled."15
The circumstances under which the Debt Collection Practices Act was
enacted call into question the degree of consumer protection it actually
affords. 1 6 The existence of a strong creditor lobby in Texas has been con105. 16 C.F.R. §§ 237.0-.6 (1976).
106. Id. § 237.0(a).
107. Compare TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.06 (Supp. 1976-1977), with
16 C.F.R. § 237.4 (1976).
108. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
109. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.06 (Supp. 1976-1977).
110.

Id. art. 5069-11.07.

111. Id. art. 5069-11.08.
112. Id. art. 5069-11.09.
113.

Id. art. 5069-11.09.

114. Id. art. 5069-11.10.
115. Id. art. 5069-11.11.
116. An emergency rider was affixed to the already approved senate bill and as
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sidered before. 117 The legislature's assumption that this Act will significantly curtail collection abuses either adds credence to that growing view or
suggests a political naivete that is difficult to comprehend.
The UCCC and PendingFederal Legislation

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) has not been adopted in
Texas, but certain of its provisions are suggestive of the type of effective prohibitions which might have been incorporated into the Texas debt collection
statute."18 In subjecting a creditor who exercises questionably unfair practices in his collection of consumer credit debts to the concept of unconscionability, the UCCC provides a more flexible device for halting multifarious
activities than the specific and somewhat rigid treatment found in the Texas
legislation. The uniform act further undercuts the remedies available to a
creditor who makes extortionate extensions of credit knowing that the consumer will probably be unable to repay this obligation. 10 The Texas Debt
Collection Practices Act failed to delineate any distinction between a consumer transaction and a commercial transaction, 120 although in the context
of the Texas Consumer Credit Code, the latter term does not appear apposite.
The lack of a cohesive federal policy on debt collection practices is also disconcerting. The federal regulations in existence do not successfully regulate
interstate collection practices. The FCC and the United States Postal Service
have regulations in the debt collection area, but these are ineffective in correcting unethical collection practices.' 2' Texas debtors are fortunate to have
amended was passed in the Texas House of Representatives on June 15, 1973. The
constitutional rule requiring that bills be read on three separate days in each house was
suspended, and on grounds of an "imperative public necessity," the Act was passed. Acts
1973, 63d Leg., ch. 547, at 1516-17.
117. Comment, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-The Case For the Consumer,
49 TEXAS L. REV. 1011 (1971). Criticism had earlier been directed toward the first 10
chapters of the Texas Consumer Credit Code, enacted by the 62d Legislature in 1971. Id.
at 1012-13. The Debt Collection Practices Act is one of three new chapters enacted by
the 63d Legislature in 1973.
118. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(2). The court may as matter of law
find that a person has engaged in unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising
from a consumer credit transaction, and grant an injunction or actual damages. The
Code forbids threatening injury to the consumer's reputation by disclosure of information
affecting his reputation for credit-worthiness knowing that the information is false or
communication with the consumer's employer prior to final judgment, for reasons other
than to verify the consumer's employment. Id. § 5.108(5)(d).
119. Id. § 5.107.
120. See generally Model Consumer Debt Collection Fair Practices Act, 80 COM.
L.J. 184 (1975). The Model Collection Act was drafted over a two-year period by the
National Conference Group of Lawyers and Collection Agencies and was created as an
aid to state legislative units seeking to eradicate the objectionable practices of the heretofore unregulated debt collectors. Id. at 184.
121. H.R. REP. No. 94-1202, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976). The Honorable
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at least a modicum of protection; thirteen states have no debt collection laws
at all. 122 Currently pending federal legislation would amend the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (CCPA),'12 creating Title VIII-"Debt Collection Prac12 4
tices" under the administration of the Federal Trade Commission.
THE NEED FOR LICENSING TEXAS COLLECTION AGENCIES

One solution which has been proposed to end some of the more nefarious
abuses which collection agencies may inflict on the defaulting debtor involves
licensing the agencies before they are allowed to operate within the state.125
Notably, the Model Act to License and Regulate Collection Agencies precludes any applicant previously convicted of certain crimes of moral turpitude
Henry Reuss of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, stated:

The Federal Trade Commission's powers are greatly limited in dealing with collectors since this agency does not have a law or trade regulation rule on debt collection practices with which to control debt collectors. All the Commission has in
the debt collection area is a set of debt collection guidelines. The Commission indicated in its testimony during hearings on this legislation [H.R. 13720, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976)] that it has had little success in regulating debt collectors. Finally,
the Commission will not take any action on individual cases of consumer harassment.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 3. Included are Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South
Dakota. Illustrative of why the state laws that do exist are ineffective is the fact that of
16 states providing for collection agency boards, 14 require by law that a majority of
the board be comprised of debt collectors. Id. at 3.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1677 (Supp. V 1975).
124. H.R. 13720, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). This amendment to the CCPA would
impose civil liability ranging from $100 to $1,000 per violation in private actions. Id. §
811 (a) (2) (A). Criminal liability ranging from one year's imprisonment, or a fine up to
$5,000, or both, may be assessed for willful and knowing noncompliance with the
proposed law. Id. § 812(2) Significantly, the House bill provides that: "[A] State law is
not inconsistent with this title if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater
than the protection provided by this title." Id. § 815. The most stringent standards yet
proposed are encompassed in H.R. 13720 for the regulation of communication between
the collector and parties other than the consumer. "A prima facie showing that consent
was not obtained may consist of testimony by the consumer. Upon such a prima facie
showing, the burden of going forward shall be with the debt collector." Id. § 804(e)
(emphasis added). Communication with third parties other than the debtor's spouse, his
parent, his attorney, and his guardian or executor, is severely limited. Id. § 804(a)(d).
125. Exemplifying the type of standards desirable for the operation of collection
agencies are those provisions contained in proposed model legislation. See Model Act to
License and Regulate Collection Agencies, 70 CoM. L.J. 38 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as

Model Licensing Act]. This act was drafted by the National Conference of Lawyers
and Collection Agencies, created under the auspices of the American Bar Association.
The conference participants were equally drawn from ABA members and from representatives of the credit community, including the Commercial Law League of America, the
National Association of Credit Management, Inc., the American Collectors Association,
and the Associated Credit Bureaus of America. Id.
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from receiving such a license.1 2 6 The Model Licensing Act delineates nineteen prohibited practices among debt collectors, which include forbidding the
use of collection instruments that simulate the form and appearance of legal
process;1 27 the publication of any list of debtors other than for credit reporting purposes; 128 the use of "shame cards," "shame automobiles," or similar
devices; methods of intimidation or methods contrary to postal regulations in
collection of accounts; 12 9 and the sharing of office space, or even a common
waiting room, with a practicing lawyer.' 30 The Model Licensing Act expressly forbids a collection agency's affirmative solicitation, purchase, or
receipt of assignments of claims for the purpose of collection, 13 a practice
that is currently allowed under Texas law only because it is not prohibited.
Moreover, the Model Licensing Act provides for investigation, suspension,
and revocation of licenses in the event a licensee violates any of its provisions or fails to maintain its financial condition sufficiently to qualify for a
license. 132 At present, lenders of regulated loans must maintain a written
record of all collection contacts, and if the contact occurs at night, the exact
time of the contact must be indicated.13 3 This is currently the only requirement of its kind in Texas, and it affects only a limited number of debtors.
Perhaps most importantly, the Model Licensing Act vests the administrator
of the licensing operation with the capacity to make rules and regulations con126. The Model Licensing Act provides for disqualification of a license applicant for
certain prior convictions:
No license shall be granted to any applicant if an individual or to any partnership
or corporate applicant if such applicant . . . has been convicted in any state or federal court of the crime of forgery, fraud, obtaining money under false pretenses,
embezzlement, extortion, larceny, burglary, breaking and entering, robbery, criminal
conspiracy to defraud, bribery, or any other crime involving moral turpitude, of
which the record of conviction ... shall be conclusive evidence.
Id. § 5.
127. Id. § 6(g).
128. Id. § 6(j).
129. Id. § 6(k). Although the Model Licensing Act does not define either "shame
cards" or "shame automobiles," the reasonable inference as to their meaning would be
some object, which when placed in proximity to the debtor's residence or place of
employment, is intended to humiliate the debtor and intimidate him to pay the debt, even
where there may be a dispute as to its authenticity.
130. Id. § 6(s).
131. Id. § 6(f).
132. Id. § 8. The administrator of the licensing procedures may additionally require
a licensee to submit for examination a verified financial statement of the licensee's
operations to determine whether the licensee is financially responsible to carry on the
business of a collection agency. Id. § 10(a). The overseer of the licensing process
would be authorized to require that books and records be kept at the agency's business
location to ascertain whether there has been compliance with the Model Licensing Act's
provisions. ld. § 10(b).
133. D. HOLMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT LAW i&TExAs 48-49 (1970). This requirement
is a matter of policy as determined by the Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner.

Id.
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sistent with its other provisions. 18 4 Such rule-making power is the logical step
to ensure that there is no circumvention by unscrupulous collectors who remain one step ahead of the lawmakers. Each licensee under the Model
Licensing Act is also required to file and maintain in force a surety bond
in an amount the licensing authority deems reasonably necessary to safeguard
the interests of the public.' 8 5 Significant also is the Model Licensing Act's
inclusion of a wide range of credit institutions under the term "collection
agency," thus not limiting its sanctions only to those enterprises ordinarily associated with the term. 186 When the possibilities for abuse such as that
evinced in Duty v. General Finance Co.18 7 are considered, it is difficult to
understand why Texas has not already enacted legislation patterned after the
Model Act to License and Regulate Collection Agencies.
CONCLUSION

The reasons for consumer default can be generally categorized to reflect
either an inability or an unwillingness to pay a debt. Unexpected curtailment
of income or increased expenditures are frequently causes of the debtor's
inability to repay his debt. The unanticipated loss of income and rival demands on remaining resources do not immediately transform the previously
solvent consumer into a "deadbeat" simply because he can no longer pay his
debts on schedule. The study by Professor Caplovitz revealed that only
slightly more than one percent of the defaulting debtors could be classified
as "deadbeats;" four times that number were thrown into "default" by subsequently discovered billing errors on the part of the creditor. 8 The
instances of harassment continue to cast doubt on the credit industry's widespread contention that it is willing to come to terms with the debtor who,
because of unexpected economic misfortune, is unable to maintain his regular
payment schedule.' 8 9
134. Model Licensing Act, supra note 125, § 12.

Unfortunately the Model Licensing

Act fails to outline any policy on creditor contact with the debtor's employer, but the
rule-making authority of the license-issuing administrator could feasibly close this avenue
of debt recovery if the abuses became rampant.
135. Id.,§ 4. By imposing the possibility of bond forfeiture for willful noncompliance
with the Model Licensing Act's provisions, the licensing authority can more effectively
ensure that only legitimate collection agencies will remain in business while the marginal
operations, which depend for their livelihood upon coercion, abuse, and harassment of
default debtors, will either cease such activities or risk loss of license.
136. Id. § 2. The term "collection agency" includes "banks, abstract companies doing
an escrow business, real estate brokers, public officers . . .lawyers, trust companies,
building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, loan or finance companies
or insurance companies."
137.

154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).

138. Proxmire, Foreword to D. CAPLovrrz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STrDy OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT at x (1974).
139. AMERICAN COLLECTORS ASS'N, A COLLECTION GUIDE FOR CREDITORS 9-10
(1976). "Absent from this list [of delinquent debtors] are those who lose employment
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If a defaulting debtor has no intention of paying his just debt, that disposition will be obvious soon enough without resort to coercion, abuse, and
intimidation. The Texas prohibition on wage garnishment 140 and the restrictions on execution on exempt property 14 should cause extenders of credit to
scrutinize prospective borrowers or users of installment credit more carefully.
The creditor's emphasis on the prospect of default should be preventive, not
remedial. The Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, while deficient in some
important areas, is nevertheless a progressive statute which advances
Texas beyond those jurisdictions that have not established any standards for
the conduct of collecting past-due accounts. The Act does nothing to proscribe the legal rights and remedies of the scrupulous creditor or collector in
the pursuit of a just debt. What it does accomplish in part is restraint of
those few underhanded practitioners in the consumer credit field who give
the entire collection industry an undeservedly bad reputation.
Amendment of the Act to prevent employer contacts would be a major
step forward, since such contacts both humiliate the debtor and frustrate his
attempt to pay the debt. Additionally, the enactment of a stringent code to
regulate and provide for licensing of collection agencies would tend to elevate
the entire industry to a more respectable level while driving the unethical
practitioners out of business. Periodic audits of accounts received and the
official perusal of records of collector contacts would restore consumer confidence in the industry and help to eliminate the pejorative connotation of debt
collection. Until such measures are taken by the Texas Legislature, the collection industry will remain suspect, and the defaulting debtor will continue
to suffer unnecessary indignities.
To
through no fault of their own and those who have unexpected financial reverses ....
these people you owe a moral obligation of leniency." The ACA represents about 50%
of the firms that collect accounts receivable for the 2.5 million credit grantors in the
United States, including retail establishments of all sizes, hospitals, physicians, dentists,
banks, corporations, and governments at all levels. Letter from Ms. Marjorie Benson,
Director of Consumer Education and Public Relations for the American Collectors
Association, Inc., to William R. Crow, Jr., October 15, 1976.
140. Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1966).
141. Id. art. 3836 (Supp. 1976-1977).
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